Florida Law Review
Volume 15

Issue 3

Article 5

December 1962

The Suspension and Removal of Florida Public Officers by the
Governor
Malcolm B. Parsons

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Malcolm B. Parsons, The Suspension and Removal of Florida Public Officers by the Governor, 15 Fla. L.
Rev. 400 (1962).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol15/iss3/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Parsons: The Suspension and Removal of Florida Public Officers by the Gove

THE SUSPENSION AND REMOVAL OF FLORIDA
PUBLIC OFFICERS BY THE GOVERNOR,
1945-1960
MALCOLM B. PARSONS*

The 1885 Florida Constitution gives the Governor the power to
suspend from public office all appointed or elected officers not liable
to impeachment., Six constitutional grounds are enumerated for the
exercise of this power: malfeasance, misfeasance, neglect of duty, commission of a felony, drunkenness, or incompetence. Public officers so
2
suspended may be removed by and with the consent of the Senate.
Together with the possibility of impeachment and removal of the
highest executive and judicial officers, the possibility of executive
suspension and removal of lesser public officers represents an American development that has gone beyond the accountability of public
officers that was possible under the common law, moving into what
Hart called "the legal framework of public administration."' 3 In its
scope, the suspension and removal power of the Governor in Florida
is unique among the states.4 In the seventy-seven years since its first
appearance in the state constitution, the provision has become a
reasonably well-settled branch of Florida's constitutional law and its
law of public officers. 5 Indeed, there have been no cases in the Su*B.A. 1946, University of Arizona; Ph.D. 1950, University of Illinois; Professor of
Government, Florida State University.
1.

FLA. CONST. art. IV, §15.

2. Ibid. The remainder of art. IV, §15 provides: "Every suspension shall continue until the adjournment of the next session of the Senate, unless the officer
suspended shall, upon the recommendation of the Governor, be removed; but the
Governor may reinstate the officer so suspended upon satisfactory evidence that
the charge or charges against him are untrue. If the Senate shall refuse to remove, or fail to take action before its adjournment, the officer suspended shall
resume the duties of the office. The Governor shall have power to fill by appointment any office, the incumbent of which has been suspended. No officer
suspended who shall under this section resume the duties of his office, shall suffer
any loss of salary or other compensation in consequence of such suspension. The
suspension or removal herein authorized shall not relieve the officer from indictment for any misdemeanor in office."
3.

HART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 171

4.

INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS

(1950).

5.

Through 1961, 26 FLORIDA STATUTES ANNOTATED lists twenty categories of

839-41 (2d ed. 1959).

issues arising under article IV, section 15, and cites throughout the authority
of some twenty-five Florida Supreme Court decisions, twelve advisory opinions
to the Governor, nine Attorney General's opinions, and four commentaries. The
categories are: appointment of substitute for absent or suspended officer; civil
service provisions; collateral attack; compensation; construction and application;
effect of removal or suspension; grounds for removal or suspension; hearing;

[400]
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preme Court questioning the Governor's use of this power since
1951 during the Warren administration.
The purpose of this article is to report some findings and make
some observations about the suspension and removal of Florida public officers by the Governor which in their nature do not appear in
the case-law precedents. These findings relate specifically to the number and kind of public officers suspended; grounds of suspension;
disposition of cases through reinstatement or removal; and the processes of suspension and disposition.
NUMBER AND KIND OF PUBLIC OFFICERS SUSPENDED

During the recent period, 1945-1960, Florida Governors have suspended a total of ninety-two public officers. 7 (See Table I). Warren
suspended the largest number of any of the recent Governors, but
the largest number for any gubernatorial term was forty-one for the
term of McCarty, partially served by McCarty (4), Johns (24), and
Collins (13). The remaining fifteen suspensions by Collins came during his own subsequent elected term. Sixty-four of the suspended
officers held local elective offices. Twenty-eight were appointees:
twenty state officers, seven members of a local Overseas Road and Toll
Bridge District Commission, and one assistant State's Attorney. All
but three of the state officers were suspended by Johns as Acting
Governor after the death in office of McCarty. Sheriffs, constables, and
county school board members comprised fifty-six per cent of all suspended local officers.
GROUNDS OF SUSPENSION

In suspending ninety-two public officers, 1945-1960, the Governors
holding over; judicial powers; liability of sureties; notice and hearing; notice to
Senate; operation and effect of removal or suspension; order of suspension; presumptions; reinstatement; resignation; Senate's action; time of suspending or removal. Cf. I ANNOT. OFF. FLA. STAT. (1956); 11 ENCY. DiG. FLA. REP. Public
Officers, §§14-16 (1955); 9 FLA. Di., Officers §§7, 73 (1952); 15 FLA. JuR. Governor,
§3 (1957); 26 FLA. JUR. Public Officers §§85, 154 (1959); 10 FLA. L. & P. Governor,
§7 (1959). A number of key questions raised in leading cases are discussed in annotations at 140 A.L.R. 1481 (1942) and 92 A.L.R. 988 (1934). Some related points
are dealt with in Note, Criminal Law: Liability of Public Officers for Neglect of
Duty, 4 U. FLA. L. REy. 264 (1951), and in the leading article by Waldby, The
Public Officer-Public Employee Distinction in Florida, 9 U. FLA. L. REv. 47 (1956).
6. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 52 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1951); State
ex rel. Kelly v. Sullivan, 52 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1951) are the latest reported.
7. The data that follow are derived from the suspension orders of the Governors and other records on file in the office of the Secretary of State, Tallahassee.
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TABLE I
NUMBER AND KIND OF PUBLIC OFFICERS SUSPENDED BY FLORIDA
GOVERNORS, 1945-1960
NUMBFER AND PER CENT OF STATE
AND LOCAL PUBLIC OFFICERS SUSPENDED BY

PUBLIC OFFICE

CALDWELL WARREN

MCCARTY

Barbers' Sanitary
Commission
Board of Control
Game and Fresh Water
Fish Commission
Hotel and Restaurant
Commission

JOHNS

COLLINS

TOTALS

1
1

2
1

2 (10%)

20 (100%)

2
4

2
13

1

5
6
4

Racing Commission
Road Board

Turnpike Authority
Total State Officers

17(85%)

1(5%)

Local
Anti-Mosquito Control
District Commission
Constable
County Board of
Public Instruction
County Commissioner
County Judge
County Sheriff
County Tax Assessor
Justice of the Peace
Notary Public
Overseas Road and Toll
Bridge District
Commission
Prosecuting Attorney
Solicitor
State's Attorney
Assistant State's

4

3

2

1

10
3
1
7

1

2

1

2

7

1

Attorney

Total Local Officers
GRAND TOTAL STATE AND
LOCAL OFFICERS

7
11

7 (10%)

28 (39%)

4 (5%)

7 (8%)

29 (32%)

4 (4%)

7 (107)

1

26 (36%) 72 (100%)

24 (26%) 28 (30%) 92 (100%)

have cited thirty-five grounds for the actions a total of 139 times. (See
Table II). Drunkenness and incompetence, which are specified by
Article IV, Section 15 of the Constitution, have been cited only six
times. The preponderance of the allegations comprise either felonies,
a ground for suspension stipulated by the Constitution, or misdemeanors, most of which could otherwise be viewed as specific forms
of malfeasance, misfeasance, or neglect of duty, which are also stipulated by the Constitution as grounds for suspension, although these
three grounds are also generally cited thirteen times. If the thirteen
8.

The generally cited grounds of malfeasance, misfeasance, or neglect of duty
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TABLE II
GROUNDS CITED BY FLORIDA GOVERNORS IN SUSPENDING
NINETY-TWO PUBLIC OFFICERS, 1945-1960
NUMBER OF TIMES
CITED BY GOVERNORS

GROUND FOR SUSPENSION

Assault .......
...............
Assault and battery .....
...........
Authorizing public construction without competitive bids
Collusion in public purchasing ...
........
Conspiracy to violate the laws ....
.........
Contributing to delinquency of a minor ........
Converting public funds to private use ..
......
Depriving persons of their civil rights ..
......
Disorderly conduct
.
.
. .
. .
.
.
.
.
Drunken driving .....
............
Drunkenness ......
.............
Embezzlement ......
.............
Exceeding authority .....
...........
Extravagant and wasteful expenditure of public funds .
Extortion .......
..............
Failure to enforce laws against gambling ........
Failure to enforce laws against vice ..
.......
Grand larceny ......
.............
Gross inequalities in assessed valuation of property .
.
Inadequate records .....
...........
Incompetence ......
.............
Larceny of hogs .....
............
Mail fraud
.
.
.
. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Malfeasance
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
.
Misfeasance
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
.
Mismanagement
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
.
Neglect of duty ...
............
Part-owner of unlawful gambling enterprise
....
Permitting lottery .....
............
Receiving and concealing stolen property ........
Reckless driving ......
............
Refusal to provide public information ..
......
Unlawful expenditure of public funds ..
......
Unlawful issuance of licenses ....
.........
Unlawful notarization .....
...........
Total .......
..............

*
.

*

.

.

.

.
.
.
.

*
*
*
*

*
*
*
*
*
.
.

*
.
*
*
.
*

2
1
12
12
4

4
4
2
3
4
6
2
17
2
8
2
3
1
9
*1 2
1
3
I
2
9
*1
2
1
*1
1
11
1
3
139

general statements of malfeasance, misfeasance, or neglect of duty
are ignored, forty-nine per cent of all specific grounds cited by the
Governors in suspending ninety-two public officers involved a violation of the public trust in the handling of public finances: authorizing public construction without competitive bids, collusion in public
purchasing, converting public funds to private use, embezzlement, extravagant and wasteful expenditure of public funds, and unlawful
expenditure of public funds.

in the suspension orders are usually supported by more specific allegations. Judicial construction has held that the mere stating of one or more constitutional
grounds for suspension is insufficient without supporting allegations of fact. State
ex rel. Hardie v. Coleman, 115 Fla. 119, 144 So. 129, 92 A.L.R. 988 (1934).
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DISPOSITION OF CASES THROUGH REINSTATEMENT OR REMOVAL

The disposition of cases of public officers suspended by the
Governors is to be understood in relation to the possibilities of reinstatement or removal. As provided in the Constitution, reinstatement
may occur in any one of three ways. The Governor may reinstate
a suspended officer. A suspended officer is regarded as reinstated - the
Constitution says he "shall resume the duties of the office" - if the
Senate refuses to remove him. Finally, reinstatement follows automatically if the Senate fails to take action before adjournment. Removal may also occur in any one of three ways. The Senate may
remove a suspended officer. Constructively, the officer may be regarded as "removed" if his term expires or if he resigns after suspension but before further action by the Governor or the Senate.
Of the ninety-two cases of suspended officers, sixty-one per cent
resulted in reinstatement, thirty-nine per cent in removal or constructive removal. (See Table III). Only fourteen per cent of the suspensions have been disposed of by Senate reinstatement and constructive
removal resulting either from expiration of the officer's term or his
resignation. More than one-half of the cases have been disposed of
through reinstatement of the officer by the Governor, and the remaining one-third through actual removal of the officer by the Senate.
Eighty per cent of all reinstatements by the Governor were of officers
suspended by Warren and Johns. Seventy per cent of all removals
by the Senate were of officers suspended by Collins.
TABLE III
DISPOSITION OF CASES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS SUSPENDED BY
FLORIDA GOVERNORS, 1945-1960
NUMBER OF PUBLIC OFFICERS SUSPENDE.D BY
DISPOSITION OF CASE

CALDWELL

Reinstated by Governor
Reinstated by refusal of
Senate to remove
Reinstated by Senate
inaction
Removed by Senate action
Constructive removal by

3

3

expiration of term before
convening of Senate
Constructive removal by
resignation of officer
before convening of

Senate
Totals

WVARREN

MCCARTY

JOHNS

COLLINS

15

4

24

3

49

1

1

2

2
6

3
21

5
30

2

1
7

3
29

TOTALS

2

4

24

28

4
92

THE PROCESSES OF SUSPENSION AND DISPOSITION

The act of suspension may be classified as resulting from a decision of the Governor based on information made available to him
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through either judicial or administrative processes. By judicial processes is meant a presentment or indictment by a grand jury, or a
prosecutor's filing of an information, or a proceeding in court. By
administrative processes is meant complaint by citizens, the report of
governmental employees or officers, citation by a legislative investigating committee, the Governor's own initiative, or any other nonjudicial way in which information leading to suspension might reach
a Governor. From this standpoint the cases of suspension have been
quite evenly distributed, fifty-five per cent of the suspensions based
on information provided by administrative processes, and forty-five
percent provided by judicial processes.
The relationship between the disposition of cases and the informational processes that led to the suspensions is quite interesting.
(See Table IV). Fifty-nine per cent of the cases of suspension originating in judicial processes were disposed of by removal, whereas only
twenty-four per cent of the cases originating in administrative processes resulted in removal. The situation with respect to cases leading
to reinstatement is, of course, just the reverse. Only forty-one per
cent of the cases originating in judicial processes, contrasted with
seventy-six per cent of the cases originating in administrative processes, culminated in reinstatement9 Disposition by removal, then, is
most closely related to those cases of suspension based on information
originating in judicial processes, whereas disposition by reinstatement
is most directly associated with cases of suspension based on information originating in administrative processes.
TABLE IV
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOURCES OF INFORMATION LEADING TO
SUSPENSION AND THE DISPOSITION OF CASES OF
SUSPENSION
DISPOSITION OF CASE THROUGH

Nu~mER OF CASES OF SUSPENSION

REMOVAL OR
REINSTATEMENT

CONsTRucTIvE
REMOVAL

TOTAL

Judicial Processes

17

24

41

Administrative Processes

39

12

51

56

36

92

ORIGINATING IN

Totals

A virtually identical pattern emerges in analyzing the seventy-nine
cases disposed of through reinstatement by the Governor or removal
9. According to the chi-square test the distribution of cases in Table IV is
statistically significant, in that the relationships between the two kinds of suspension and reinstatement or removal could be expected to occur by chance
fewer than five times out of a thousand.
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by the Senate. Fifty-six per cent of these cases were initiated by administrative processes and forty-four per cent by judicial processes.
Of the cases beginning in judicial processes, fifty-seven per cent culminated in removal by the Senate; every instance of the forty-three
per cent that ended in reinstatement by the Governor came after some
form of judicial action in favor of the suspended officer, such as dismissal of charges, over-turned indictment, or acquittal in court. On
the other hand, seventy-seven per cent of the cases originating in administrative processes were disposed of through reinstatement by the
Governor, only twenty-three per cent of these cases culminating in
removal. One-half of these reinstatements were by Collins of state
officers suspended by Johns.
Following are five examples covering thirty of the thirty-nine
cases of administrative suspension and subsequent reinstatement of
public officers in which no judicial processes were involved:
(1) On August 24, 1950, Governor Warren suspended four
members of the Calhoun County Board of Public Instruction
on the charge that they had voted to incur indebtedness in
excess of the expenditures allowable by law. On May 18, 1951,
after an investigation and hearing by Governor Warren, the
officers were reinstated.
(2) Between November 10 and December 10, 1953, Acting
Governor Johns suspended the six members of the State Road
Board, five members of the State Racing Commission, five
members of the Florida Turnpike Authority, and the Hotel
and Restaurant Commissioner, all of whom had been appointed by Governor McCarty. The members of the Road
Board were charged with purchases beyond legal limits, not
calling for competitive bids, failure to provide necessary approaches to the lower Tampa Bay Toll Bridge, and purchasing
seed from a company owned by the board chairman. The
members of the Racing Commission were charged with paying
an attorney for the Commission more than allowed by law.
The members of the Turnpike Authority were charged with
extravagant, unnecessary and wasteful expenditure of public
funds by calling for new surveys for a proposed turnpike after
previous studies had already been made. The Hotel Commissioner was charged with inadequate knowledge and experience,
and waste of public funds through employment of unqualified personnel. These officers were reinstated by Governor
Collins, after hearings, on January 4, 1955.
(3) April 7, 1954, Acting Governor Johns suspended seven
members of the Board of Commissioners of the Monroe County
Overseas Road and Toll Bridge District, charging them with
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failure to safeguard public funds, letting contracts in violation
of law, and failure to keep adequate records. On July 1, 1954,
after investigation and hearing, Acting Governor Johns reinstated them.
(4) September 3, 1954, Acting Governor Johns suspended
a member of the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission on
charges of failure to carry out the hyacinth control program and
causing chronic friction and lack of cooperation among the
agency's personnel. The officer was reinstated by Governor
Collins, after the above-mentioned hearings on January 4, 1955.
(5) September 28, 1959, Governor Collins suspended the
Seminole County Tax Assessor on charges of maintaining gross
inequalities and insufficiencies in the assessed value of property
in violation of the legal responsibilities of the office. While
suspended, the Assessor ran for and won re-election on a campaign promise to accept and carry out a proposed re-assessment,
and was reinstated by Governor Collins. This was the only instance in which Collins moved to carry out an earlier general
statement that he would use the power of suspension in order to
require full value assessment in accordance with law. This was
countered by statements of such Senate leaders as former Acting
Governor Johns that they would reinstate any Assessor that
Collins suspended.
From the foregoing illustrations it is apparent that many of the
suspensions and dispositions that have occurred within the framework of administrative processes have had political overtones.
SUMMARY oF FINDINGS

The data reported above indicate the following twelve major
points with respect to the Governor's use of the power of suspension:
(1) ninety-two public officers have been suspended by Florida
Governors in the period 1945-1960;
(2) sixty-one per cent of all suspensions have resulted in
some kind of reinstatement;
(3) seventy per cent of those suspended held local elective
offices;
(4) forty-nine per cent of a wide range of grounds cited in
the suspension orders alleged violation of the public trust in
the handling of public finances;
(5) forty-four percent of the suspensions were concentrated
during the term of McCarty, 1953-1956, partially served by
McCarty, Johns, and Collins;
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(6) eighty per cent of all reinstatements by the Governor
were of officers suspended by Warren and Johns;
(7) seventy per cent of all officers suspended by Johns
were reinstated by Collins;
(8) seventy per cent of all removals by the Senate were of
officers suspended by Collins;
(9) fifty-five per cent of the suspensions have occurred within the framework of administrative processes, forty-five per
cent within the framework of judicial processes;
(10) removal has been most closely related to suspensions
based on information provided by judicial processes;
(11) reinstatement has been most closely related to suspensions based on information provided by administrative processes;
(12) many of the suspensions and dispositions that have involved administrative processes have had political overtones.
Although the data since 1960 are incomplete, it may be noted
that during his first sixteen months in office Governor Bryant used
his power of suspension thirteen times, suspending five Constables, two
Justices of the Peace, a Clerk of a Circuit Court, a Clerk of a Civil
and Criminal Court, a Commissioner of a Hospital District Board, a
County Commissioner, a Notary Public, and a Sheriff. During the
special legislative session in the summer of 1962, the Senate considered eleven of these cases. The Senate removed four Constables,
two Justices of the Peace, one Clerk of a Civil and Criminal Court,
one County Commissioner, and one Notary Public. It refused to
remove, thus reinstating, one Sheriff and one Constable.

CONCLUSIONS

From the standpoint of law, two key operational aspects of the
system of suspension and removal may be differentiated. First, in
that forty-five per cent of the cases where the impetus for suspension
and subsequent reinstatement or removal, has been within the judicial
processes, the Florida system may be viewed as essentially an improvement of the older common-law system that imposed criminal liability
on public officers by making malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance
in office indictable offenses, and which provided for the removal of an
officer only for cause after notice and hearing. The significant thing
about this aspect of the system is that nearly one-half of all the cases
of suspension, 1945-1960, occurred after the Governor had been informed that judicial proceedings for some offense were underway
against the officer, and his subsequent reinstatement or removal turned
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on the outcome of those judicial proceedings. The traditional procedures of indictment by a grand jury, or the filing by a public prosecutor of an information, followed by a trial culminating either in
acquittal or conviction would seem to be elaborately well-suited for
the protection of both the public's and the officer's interests in the
office. As it has operated in forty-five per cent of the cases the system
has actually afforded the suspended officer a judicial hearing even
though he has no entitlement to one as the Florida courts have construed the Constitution.o
The second key aspect of the system is that in the remaining fiftyfive per cent of the cases in which the impetus for suspension, and
subsequent reinstatement or removal, has been within administrative processes its operational character has been quite different. In
many instances it has been essentially political. Further, the procedures of fact-finding, standards of proof, and rights of the officer
have been handled quite differently within the administrative processes than in those cases in which suspension and disposition have
been tied to the operations of the courts.
Interestingly enough, then, although the Constitution as written
and as interpreted by the courts does not seem to contemplate a dual
system of suspension, it is seen to operate in dual fashion with one
set of procedures and standards that under certain circumstances is
essentially judicial, and another set that under other circumstances
is essentially administrative. As generally acknowledged:"1
"The American concept of a public office is that of a public
agency or trust created in the interest and for the benefit of
the people ....
But it does not follow ... that he may be deprived of his office without a hearing when the right to have it
terminate is limited to specified causes. The incumbent's right
to the office is everywhere recognized as a privilege entitled to
the protection of the law ... ."
It is questionable whether the administrative procedures and standards of the Florida system have as adequately protected either the
public's or the officer's interest in the office as have the judicial procedures and standards.
10. The Governor's power is executive, and not judicial or quasi-judicial.
State ex rel. Hatton v. Foughin, 103 Fla. 877, 138 So. 392 (1931). His power is
judgmental and discretionary, including the power to hear and decide. State ex rel.
Hardie v. Coleman, supra note 8. The officer has no constitutional right to notice
and hearing before suspension. State ex rel. Lamar v. Johnson, 30 Fla. 433, 11 So.
845 (1892). The hearing the officer is entitled to is not judicial, and it is afforded
by the Governor before reinstatement, or by the Senate on considering the Governor's recommendation or removal. State ex rel. Lamar v. Johnson, supra. See
also the references in footnote 4, supra.
11. 42 Am. JUR. Public Oficers, §§8, 9 (1942).
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